Deprecating Safe Haskell, or heavily investing in it?

Viktor Dukhovni ietf-dane at dukhovni.org
Tue Dec 27 20:12:44 UTC 2022


On Tue, Dec 27, 2022 at 06:09:59PM +0100, H├ęcate wrote:

> Now, there are two options (convenient!) that are left to us:
> 
> 1. Deprecate Safe Haskell: We remove the Safe mechanism as it exists 
> today, and keep the IO restriction under another name. This will 
> certainly cause much joy amongst maintainers and GHC developers alike. 
> The downside is that we don't have a mechanism to enforce "Strict 
> type-safety" anymore.
> 
> 2. We heavily invest in Safe Haskell: This is the option where we amend 
> the PVP to take changes of Safety annotations into account, invest in 
> workforce to fix the bugs on the GHC side. Which means we also invest in 
> the tools that check for PVP compatibility to check for Safety. This is 
> not the matter of a GSoC, or a 2-days hackathon, and I would certainly 
> have remorse sending students to the salt mines like that.
> 
> I do not list the Status Quo as an option because it is terrible and has 
> led us to regularly have complaints from both GHC & Ecosystem libraries 
> maintainers. There can be no half-measures that they usually tend to 
> make us slide back into the status quo.
> 
> So, what do you think?

I think that "Restricted IO" would in principle be the more sensible
approach.  HOWEVER, for robust "sandboxing" of untrusted code what's
required is more than just hiding the raw IO Monad from the sandboxed
code.  Doing that securely is much too difficult to do correctly, as
evidenced by the ultimate failure (long history of bypass issues) of
similar efforts for enabling restricted execution of untrusted code in
Java (anyone still using Java "applets", or running Flash in their
browser???).

The only way to do this correctly is to provide strong memory separation
between the untrusted code and the TCB.  The only mainstream working
examples of this that I know of are:

    * Kernel vs. user space memory separation.

    * Tcl's multiple interpreters, where untrusted code runs in
      slave interpreters stripped of most verbs, with aliases
      added to wrappers that call back into the parent interpreter
      for argument validation and restricted execution.

Both systems provide strong memory isolation of untrusted code, only
data passes between the untrusted code and the TCB through a limited
set of callbacks (system calls if you like).

For "Safe Haskell" to really be *safe*, memory access from untrusted
code would need to be "virtualised", with a separate heap and foreign
memory allocator for evaluation of untrusted code, and the RTS rewriting
and restricting all direct memory access.  This means that "peek" and
"poke" et. al. would not directly read memory, but rather be restricted
to specific address ranges allocated to the untrusted task.

Essentially the RTS would have to become a user-space microkernel.

This is in principle possible, but it is not clear whether this is worth
doing, given limited resources.

To achieve "safe" execution, restricted code needs to give up some
runtime performance, just compile-time safety checks are not
sufficiently robust in practice.  For example, the underlying byte
arrays (pinned or not) behind ByteString and Text when used from
untrusted code would not allow access to data beyond the array bounds
(range checked on every access), ...  which again speaks to some
"virtualisation" of memory access by the RTS, at least to the extent of
always performing range checks when running untrusted code.

Bottom line, I don't trust systems like Safe Haskell, or Java's
type-system-based sandboxing of untrusted code, ... that try to perform
sandboxing in a shared address space by essentially static analysis
alone.  We've long left shared address space security systems DOS and
MacOS 9 behind... good riddance.

-- 
    Viktor.


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