[Haskell] PostDoc in using Formal Methods for finding security vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in business-process-driven systems (Deadline: 2024-04-18)
Achim D. Brucker
adbrucker at 0x5f.org
Sat Mar 30 11:12:06 UTC 2024
Dear all,
As part of a US funded project, we have an exciting opportunity for a PostDoc in
the Security and Trust of Advanced Systems Group at the University of Exeter
(UK) to work applying formal methods to enterprise systems:
We will use formal methods (e.g., model checking, SMT solving, interactive
theorem proving), to analyze business-process-driven (enterprise) systems (e.g.,
business logic and workflows described a BPMN models). A particular focus will
be the analysis of complex compositions of workflows within one organization as
well as across multiple organizations.
In particular, we will develop novel techniques to detect faults and
vulnerabilities (that can be exploited by both internal and external attackers)
in complex business-process-driven systems, contributing to protecting critical
workflows such as manufacturing or logistics.
In such environments, attackers can exploit such faults and vulnerabilities to
cause all kinds of harm such as direct financial losses or causing the
production of safety or security critical products to stop. Overall, the project
aims to develop automated techniques for assessing the risk of business process
or workflows as well as finding and mitigating such attacks.
This is a unique opportunity for somebody wanting to use/apply formal methods to
the security of large enterprise systems.
More information and application details can be found at:
* <https://jobs.exeter.ac.uk/hrpr_webrecruitment/wrd/run/etrec179gf.open?WVID=171839ediw&LANG=USA&VACANCY_ID=386422ijTy>
Application deadline is the 18th of April 2024. Please contact me for more details.
Best,
Achim
--
Prof. Achim Brucker | Chair in Cybersecurity & Head of Group | University of Exeter
https://www.brucker.ch | https://logicalhacking.com/blog
@adbrucker | @logicalhacking
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