[Haskell-cafe] Package Takeover: `toml`

Chris Dornan chris at chrisdornan.com
Fri Mar 12 17:10:03 UTC 2021


> > I don't think there is any need for a public announcment if a package
creator hands over maintainership to another developer.

> Well, there have been some rather unfortunate transfers of control of
widely used packages (in other ecosystems than hackage) to shady operators
> who made malicious changes.  This is more directly a concern for browser
plugins, or "apps", but also
> applies to Python, Ruby, Node and ultimately even Haskell.

Viktor makes some great points, but we do not have any such checks in place
at the moment.

Currently it is accepted that a package maintainer can get help maintaining
a package through whatever means. The original package maintainer can step
off at a later time, leaving the new maintainers in charge.

At this stage, I think we should stop piling in on Tom -- it does not seem
right, at all.

Chris

On Fri, 12 Mar 2021 at 16:59, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane at dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> > On Mar 12, 2021, at 2:42 PM, Henning Thielemann <
> lemming at henning-thielemann.de> wrote:
> >
> > I don't think there is any need for a public announcment if a package
> creator hands over maintainership to another developer.
>
> Well, there have been some rather unfortunate transfers of control of
> widely used packages (in other ecosystems than hackage) to shady operators
> who made malicious changes.  This is more directly a concern for browser
> plugins, or "apps", but also
> applies to Python, Ruby, Node and ultimately even Haskell.
>
> Supply chain security is a hard problem, and any transparency in changes
> of control would be great.
>
> If release tarballs are digitally signed, and contributors can be
> expected to not hand over their own keys when transferring control,
> but rather to arrange for new keys to be authorised to continue to
> make releases, then such changes of control could be noted on hackage
> as a change in which key signed a new release.
>
> Cautious users might pin the release keys trusted to sign a given
> dependency, and could then review and approve imports of these
> if signed by not yet trusted keys.  There could even be a role
> for trusted reviewers (and ideally a means to compensate them
> for their work).  I did mention this is a hard problem...
>
> --
>         Viktor.
>
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