[Haskell-cafe] Improvements to package hosting and security
dct25-561bs at mythic-beasts.com
Tue Apr 14 06:42:46 UTC 2015
The cryptocurrency model is interesting, certainly, but it's solving a
quite different problem: by giving authority to the majority of
computational power, it allows users to trust the network without
needing to break anonymity. Anonymity is really hard, and not needed
here. Without it, the cryptocurrency model is basically just Git: a
sequence of transactions that can be cryptographically verified.
Stick with the Git + GPG plan IMO.
On 14 April 2015 at 06:01, Michael Snoyman <michael at snoyman.com> wrote:
> That could work in theory. My concern with such an approach is that- AFAIK-
> the tooling around that kind of stuff is not very well developed, as opposed
> to an approach using Git, SHA512, and GPG, which should be easy to combine.
> But I could be completely mistaken on this point; if existing, well vetted
> technology exists for this, I'm not opposed to using it.
> On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 6:04 PM Arnaud Bailly | Capital Match
> <arnaud at capital-match.com> wrote:
>> Just thinking aloud but wouldn't it be possible to take advantage of
>> cryptographic ledgers a la Bitcoin for authenticating packages and tracking
>> the history of change ? This would provide redundancy as the transactions
>> log is distributed and "naturally" create a web of trust or at least
>> authenticate transactions. People uploading or modifying a package would
>> have to sign a transactions with someone having enough karma to allow this.
>> Then packages themselves could be completely and rather safely distributed
>> through standard p2p file sharing.
>> I am not a specialist of crypto money, though.
>> My 50 cts
>> Le lundi 13 avril 2015, Dennis J. McWherter, Jr. <dennis at deathbytape.com>
>> a écrit :
>>> This proposal looks great. The one thing I am failing to understand (and
>>> I recognize the proposal is in early stages) is how to ensure redundancy in
>>> the system. As far as I can tell, much of this proposal discusses the
>>> centralized authority of the system (i.e. ensuring secure distribution) and
>>> only references (with little detail) the distributed store. For instance,
>>> say I host a package on a personal server and one day I decide to shut that
>>> server down; is this package now lost forever? I do see this line: "backup
>>> download links to S3" but this implies that the someone is willing to pay
>>> for S3 storage for all of the packages.
>>> Are there plans to adopt a P2P-like model or something similar to support
>>> any sort of replication? Public resources like this seem to come and go, so
>>> it would be nice to avoid some of the problems associated with high churn in
>>> the network. That said, there is an obvious cost to replication. Likewise,
>>> the central authority would have to be updated with new, relevant locations
>>> to find the file (as it is currently proposed).
>>> In any case, as I said before, the proposal looks great! I am looking
>>> forward to this.
>>> On Monday, April 13, 2015 at 5:02:46 AM UTC-5, Michael Snoyman wrote:
>>>> Many of you saw the blog post Mathieu wrote about having more
>>>> composable community infrastructure, which in particular focused on
>>>> improvements to Hackage. I've been discussing some of these ideas with both
>>>> Mathieu and others in the community working on some similar thoughts. I've
>>>> also separately spent some time speaking with Chris about package
>>>> signing. Through those discussions, it's become apparent to me that there
>>>> are in fact two core pieces of functionality we're relying on Hackage for
>>>> * A centralized location for accessing package metadata (i.e., the cabal
>>>> files) and the package contents themselves (i.e., the sdist tarballs)
>>>> * A central authority for deciding who is allowed to make releases of
>>>> packages, and make revisions to cabal files
>>>> In my opinion, fixing the first problem is in fact very straightforward
>>>> to do today using existing tools. FP Complete already hosts a full Hackage
>>>> mirror backed by S3, for instance, and having the metadata mirrored to a
>>>> Git repository as well is not a difficult technical challenge. This is the
>>>> core of what Mathieu was proposing as far as composable infrastructure,
>>>> corresponding to next actions 1 and 3 at the end of his blog post (step 2,
>>>> modifying Hackage, is not a prerequesite). In my opinion, such a system
>>>> would far surpass in usability, reliability, and extensibility our current
>>>> infrastructure, and could be rolled out in a few days at most.
>>>> However, that second point- the central authority- is the more
>>>> interesting one. As it stands, our entire package ecosystem is placing a
>>>> huge level of trust in Hackage, without any serious way to vet what's going
>>>> on there. Attack vectors abound, e.g.:
>>>> * Man in the middle attacks: as we are all painfully aware,
>>>> cabal-install does not support HTTPS, so a MITM attack on downloads from
>>>> Hackage is trivial
>>>> * A breach of the Hackage Server codebase would allow anyone to upload
>>>> nefarious code
>>>> * Any kind of system level vulnerability could allow an attacker to
>>>> compromise the server in the same way
>>>> Chris's package signing work addresses most of these vulnerabilities, by
>>>> adding a layer of cryptographic signatures on top of Hackage as the central
>>>> authority. I'd like to propose taking this a step further: removing Hackage
>>>> as the central authority, and instead relying entirely on cryptographic
>>>> signatures to release new packages.
>>>> I wrote up a strawman proposal last week which clearly needs work to
>>>> be a realistic option. My question is: are people interested in moving
>>>> forward on this? If there's no interest, and everyone is satisfied with
>>>> continuing with the current Hackage-central-authority, then we can proceed
>>>> with having reliable and secure services built around Hackage. But if
>>>> others- like me- would like to see a more secure system built from the
>>>> ground up, please say so and let's continue that conversation.
>>>>  https://www.fpcomplete.com/blog/2015/03/hackage-mirror
>>>>  I don't think this is just a theoretical possibility for some point
>>>> in the future. I have reported an easily trigerrable DoS attack on the
>>>> current Hackage Server codebase, which has been unresolved for 1.5 months
>>>>  https://gist.github.com/snoyberg/732aa47a5dd3864051b9
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>> Arnaud Bailly
>> CTO | Capital Match
>> 71 Ayer Rajah Crescent | #06-16 | Singapore 139951
>> (FR) +33 617 121 978 / (SG) +65 8408 7973 | arnaud at capital-match.com |
>> Capital Match Platform Pte. Ltd. (the "Company") registered in Singapore
>> (Co. Reg. No. 201501788H), a subsidiary of Capital Match Holdings Pte. Ltd.
>> (Co. Reg. No. 201418682W), provides services that involve arranging for
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