[Haskell-cafe] Tor project

[Dario Bertini]

On Thu, Jul 31, 2014 at 2:11 PM, Wojtek Narczyński <wojtek at power.com.pl> wrote:
> But, AFAIK, the (necessary and sufficient) protection against timing attacks
> is the addition of randomized waits. In the protocol layer, not in pure
> encryption/decryption/hashing routines.

I agree that we don't have a lot of evidence for/against timing
attacks in functional languages (that I know of).

But adding a randomized delay never seemed the correct solution to me
(granted, I had the luck to never had to write code sensitive to such
issues, and I never wrote a timing attack exploit either), I don't
think that doing it in the protocol layer makes it neither necessary
nor sufficient.

http://rdist.root.org/2010/01/07/timing-independent-array-comparison/

This explains the pitfalls in some possible timing attack misconceptions

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