[Haskell-cafe] Offer to mirror Hackage

Vincent Hanquez tab at snarc.org
Thu Dec 9 10:55:32 CET 2010

  On 08/12/10 10:41, Ketil Malde wrote:
> Yes.  And you should start with assessing how much cost and
> inconvenience you are willing to suffer for the improvement in
> security you gain.  In this case, my assertion is that the marginal
> worsening of security by having a mirror of hackage even without signing
> of packages etc., is less than the marginal improvement in usability.
> I'm a bit surprised to find that there seems to be a lot of opposition
> to this view, but perhaps the existing structure is more secure than I
> thought?  Or the benefit of a mirror is exaggerated - I can see how
> it would be annoying to have hackage down, but it hasn't happened to my,
> so perhaps those complaining about it just were very unlucky.

You might have misunderstood what I was talking about. I'm proposing 
signing on the hackage server on reception of the package,
where it can be verified by cabal that the package hasn't been signed 
properly. This is not about all the way
signing of every uploaders, with chain of trust and such (which has been 
proposed by wren).

The implication on the users should be minimal. I mean they shouldn't 
even know about it. It would only complain if the signature isn't valid.


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