[GHC] #3910: +RTS options introduce a security problem for, e.g., setuid binaries

[GHC]

#3910: +RTS options introduce a security problem for, e.g., setuid binaries
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  Reporter:  andersk                      |          Owner:  simonmar        
      Type:  bug                          |         Status:  closed          
  Priority:  normal                       |      Milestone:  7.0.2           
 Component:  Runtime System               |        Version:  7.1             
Resolution:  fixed                        |       Keywords:                  
  Testcase:                               |      Blockedby:                  
Difficulty:                               |             Os:  Unknown/Multiple
  Blocking:                               |   Architecture:  Unknown/Multiple
   Failure:  Incorrect result at runtime  |  
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Comment(by andersk):

 Replying to [comment:9 guest]:
 > just to turn on basic things like -N which should be reasonably safe.

 How do you know that passing -N to a setuid binary couldn’t be used to
 perform a denial of service attack by spawning many threads as root?

 But in general, it should never be up to the compiler to say how the
 ''program compiled with it'' interprets its command-line arguments and
 environment variables.  If the programmer wants to allow the user to
 change the program’s behavior in those ways, then the programmer needs to
 say so.

-- 
Ticket URL: <http://hackage.haskell.org/trac/ghc/ticket/3910#comment:10>
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